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9 July 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev probably attempting to maneuver Bonn into foregoing West Berlin Bundestag session this fall under threat of new crisis. ①



Soviet support for East German efforts to assert control over Allied missions suggested by stiff reply to British protest. ②

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Yemen--Bloc personnel attempting to gain favor with Imam while undermining his regime; Imam's prestige lowered by internal difficulties. ③

### LATE ITEM

Disturbances in Republic of Congo. ④



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK USSR: Khrushchev's warning that the USSR might use a meeting of the West German Bundestag in West Berlin this fall as a pretext for signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany was probably intended to force Bonn either to forego this meeting, which has been held annually in recent years, or assume responsibility for provoking a new and dangerous Berlin crisis. Khrushchev's move probably is also intended to serve notice to the West that his conditional commitment to maintain the status quo in Berlin until another summit meeting can be held in six to eight months does not imply any retreat from the USSR's objective of achieving a change in the city's status.

Although Chancellor Adenauer and other top leaders of his Christian Democratic party were in agreement in late June that they were not inclined to risk Soviet retaliation, they may view Khrushchev's warning as a formal challenge requiring a reappraisal.

East Germany: A stiff Soviet note handed on 4 July to the British commander in chief in West Germany, together with three new incidents on 4 and 5 July involving harassment of British mission personnel by East German police, suggests Moscow is supporting the Ulbricht regime's efforts to assert control over the Allied missions. In the note--a formal reply to a British protest concerning an earlier East German assault on mission members--the Soviet commander in chief accused the British of provoking incidents and stated that he could prevent further trouble only if the mission "strictly observes the laws and regulations of the German Democratic Republic." This contrasted with the apparently conciliatory tone of his earlier verbal answer. As a result of the continued harassment, the British commander in chief has temporarily suspended all travel by the mission.

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1 [ Yemen: Although the Imam has recently suppressed a tribal rebellion in Yemen, the internal situation remains disturbed. Financial difficulties and general unrest among the populace have lowered the Imam's prestige at a time when he is working especially hard to ensure the succession of his son, Crown Prince Badr. Communist bloc personnel are endeavoring to expand their economic and cultural activities in order to gain favor with the Imam. At the same time, they are undermining the medieval regime by implanting new ideas. Pro-Western Yemeni officials are urging that a "swift and adequate" aid program by the United States be instituted to halt the expansion of Communist prestige. 25X1

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## LATE ITEM

NO \*Congo: The total breakdown of authority in Leopoldville Province from 6 to 8 July could foreshadow the disintegration of the newly-independent Congo. The American consulate in Elisabethville has characterized separatist elements there as awaiting only the propitious moment to secede from the Congo. The anti-European disorders of 8 July, led by mutineers from the Force Publique, continued unchecked for most of the day, and at one time held the American embassy under siege. Two companies of infantry are being flown from Brussels to reinforce Belgian Army troops at bases in the Congo. A degree of order appears to have been restored by the evening of 8 July, but further disorders are possible and the Lumumba government appears fearful of a coup d'etat. 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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Khrushchev Warns West German Action May Create New  
Berlin Crisis

Khrushchev used his final press conference in Vienna on 8 July to threaten unilateral action on a separate peace treaty with East Germany if Bonn holds its annual meeting of the Bundestag in West Berlin this fall. Using ambiguous terms as he did in earlier private talks with Austrian officials, the Soviet premier warned that "we will consider whether it would be possible to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic at the same time as the Bundestag holds its sessions."

Khrushchev's primary aim probably is to force Bonn either to back down from the established practice of meeting once a year in Berlin or to accept responsibility for provoking a new and dangerous Berlin crisis. Moscow may have been encouraged to tie its new threat to the Bundestag action by the belief that the three Western powers and Bonn would be divided on the issue as was the case in June 1959.

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Khrushchev may also be using the new threat to dispel Western speculation that he is seeking a way out of his commitment to change the status of Berlin, and to make it clear that his commitment to maintain the status quo is conditional on Western willingness to refrain from "provocative" actions.

Although Chancellor Adenauer and other top leaders of his Christian Democratic party were in agreement in late June that they were not inclined to risk Soviet retaliation, they may view Khrushchev's warning as a challenge requiring a reappraisal. West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt is expected to view a cancellation of the Bundestag session as an unnecessary concession harmful to the city's morale.

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East German Police Step Up Harassment of British Military Liaison Mission  
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Recent developments suggest that Moscow is supporting East Germany's intensified pressure on the Allied Military Liaison Missions (MLM) accredited to Colonel General Yakubovsky, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. On 4 July, the British commander in chief in West Germany was handed Yakubovsky's formal answer to the British note of 24 June which had strongly protested the assault by East German secret police on Brigadier Packard and other members of the British mission. In contrast with his apparently conciliatory remarks on receiving the British note, Yakubovsky in his note accused the British of carrying out "activities which, under the present circumstances, could lead to undesirable consequences," and undertook to guarantee safety of mission personnel only "so long as the members of the mission strictly observe the laws and regulations of the German Democratic Republic."

Meanwhile, East German police have intensified their harassment of the British mission, which they appear to have selected as a special target, using "traffic violations" as a pretext. On 4 July, the East Germans attempted to force MLM members into an East German police car. On 5 July, a mission car was stopped in Potsdam on the allegation it had exceeded the speed limit. On the same day, East German police halted a British mission officer traveling on the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn and threatened him with armed violence. The East Germans also have harassed the US and French missions, but to a lesser degree.

Fearing that the East Germans will stage even more serious incidents in an effort to pin spying charges on mission officers, the British commander in chief in West Germany has temporarily suspended travel by the mission. London, which thought Yakubovsky's letter was highly unsatisfactory, is considering whether to take the question up on a high diplomatic level, either in Moscow or London, or to continue action through military channels.

Meanwhile, the chief of the French mission, who submitted a stiff letter of protest to Yakubovsky following an assault on a mission car on 8 June, has received no answer.

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The Yemeni Situation

The Imam's ruthless suppression of a recent tribal rebellion has not eliminated unrest in Yemen. Financial difficulties, a hungry and embittered population, and increasing dissident activities have lowered the Imam's prestige. Subversive activities by the Free Yemeni Movement, based in Cairo and Aden, add to the Imam's problems.

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Although the Imam apparently has little reason at the moment to fear that his regime will be overthrown, Badr's succession is open to question. The 32-year-old Badr is considered weaker than his father, and has less influence on the key tribes that would determine the succession.

Communist bloc representatives in Yemen are tempting the Imam with offers for oil and mineral exploitation, road building, and irrigation and industrial projects. The Imam has hoped that projects of this type would help him to assure Badr's succession. Working through pro-Soviet officials, the bloc is campaigning to undermine the position of pro-Western officials and create resentment against the US for not readily complying with the Imam's wishes. At the same time, Chinese and Soviet technicians in Yemen are stirring up popular dissatisfaction by intimating that the Imam is retarding progress.

Pro-Western officials, including Prince Abd al-Rahman, the Imam's brother, are urging American support for Badr as a tactic to regain the Imam's favor. Badr, in conversation with the American chargé last April, expressed his concern over Communist inroads, but said Yemen must at present accept bloc assistance because it "cannot afford to stand still any longer."

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